The term ‘designer baby’ is usually used in a pejorative sense – to conjure up some dystopian Brave New World. There are already ways to affect what kind of children you have – most obviously by choosing the partner to have them with. But there are others too: a pregnant mother can improve her baby’s prospects by not smoking, for instance. With advances in genetics, however, there will soon be radical new methods to select or influence the characteristics of your progeny: not just physical characteristics, like height or eye colour, but intellectual capacities, and capacities linked to morality – such as how empathetic the child will be. The big question is how much freedom parents should have to make such selections.
Julian Savulescu of Oxford’s Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, believes that if we can genetically alter the next generation, not only should we be free to do so, it may even turn out that in some circumstances we have an obligation to go ahead and do it.
Professor Julian Savulescu has held the Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford from 2002 - 2022. He has degrees in medicine, neuroscience and bioethics. He directs the Oxford Martin Programme for Collective Responsibility for Infectious Disease at the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford. He co-directs the interdisciplinary Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities in collaboration with Public Health, Psychiatry and History.
Julian Savulescu of Oxford’s Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, believes that if we can genetically alter the next generation, not only should we be free to do so, it may even turn out that in some circumstances we have an obligation to go ahead and do it.
Professor Julian Savulescu has held the Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford from 2002 - 2022. He has degrees in medicine, neuroscience and bioethics. He directs the Oxford Martin Programme for Collective Responsibility for Infectious Disease at the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford. He co-directs the interdisciplinary Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities in collaboration with Public Health, Psychiatry and History.
Another short interview here (Mp3): http://media.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/bio...BYBa3dsoEF6VUA
Other information about him:https://www.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk...lian-savulescu
He is co-author of the chapter "Moral Neuroenhancement" in the 2017 Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics
In this chapter, we introduce the notion of “moral neuroenhancement,” offering a novel definition as well as spelling out three conditions under which we expect that such neuroenhancement would be most likely to be permissible (or even desirable). Furthermore, we draw a distinction between first-order moral capacities, which we suggest are less promising targets for neurointervention, and second-order moral capacities, which we suggest are more promising. We conclude by discussing concerns that moral neuroenhancement might restrict freedom or otherwise “misfire,” and argue that these concerns are not as damning as they may seem at first.
The chapter is available here: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK493126/
The chapter is available here: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK493126/
Present-day biohybrid technologies increasingly allow us to escape the experiential confines of our biological bodies. However, as human agents spend more time in virtual environments, and as the prospects for telepresence become more sophisticated, a number of philosophical and ethical questions arise. This chapter considers a range of examples of virtual reality and telepresence technologies. It examines the value of the virtual experience, asking how virtual experiences contribute to our wellbeing. It asks whether human agents can be authentically “themselves” in virtual environments, and how to understand the relationship between virtual and real acts. It considers the ethical principles governing behavior in virtual environments, addressing how these will or will not differ from the ethical principles governing behavior in non-virtual life. Finally, the chapter addresses the ethical questions raised by the prospect of acting at a distance through telepresence technology, focusing particularly on the moral responsibility of the telepresent agent for her remote acts, and on the harm that might be inflicted on the telepresent agent.
https://academic.oup.com/book/32673/...VI&login=false
https://academic.oup.com/book/32673/...VI&login=false
Gassho, J
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